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In 1960 George Kennan, the American diplomat and historian,
warned Americans that:
[I]nternational life normally has in it strong competitive elements.
It did not take the challenge of Communism to produce the situa-
tion. Just as there is no uncomplicated personal relationship be-
tween individuals, so, I think, there is no international relation-
ship between sovereign states which is without its elements of
antagonism, [or] its competitive aspects. Many of the present re-
lationships of international life are only the eroded remnants of
ones which, at one time, were relationships of most uncompromis-
ing hostility. Every government is in some respects a problem for
every other government, and it will always be this way so long as
the sovereign state, with its supremely self-centered rationale, re-
mains the basis of international life. The variety of historical ex-
perience and geographic situation would assure the prevalence of
this situation even if such things as human error and ambitions
did not.'
Today's international scene and America's role in it seems, tem-
porarily at least, to be in a more cooperative mode than Kennan
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predicted. Throughout Eastern Europe, the Communist party is
sharing political power and tolerating private property. Baltic
States are testing various forms of independence. Formerly closed
economic systems are applying for Western financial credits. Closed
borders are now open. To the west, Europe prepares for the dissolu-
tion of its economic boundaries in 1992. Third World nations have
tied their futures to American banks, and some of these banks are
suffering well-deserved anxiety. Throughout the world, the most in-
fluential economic entities are no longer exclusively nation-states,
but also multinational corporations.
All of this reflects a rapidly changing and yet unformed interna-
tional world order. And in this volatile international climate, the
words of James William Fullbright, former Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee are instructive: we cannot be handi-
capped by policies based on old myths. Instead we must recognize
current realities.
Governments, including our own, have recognized that nations,
no matter how powerful, cannot alone solve such world problems as
terrorism, poverty, or environmental destruction. Nation-states
search for consensus, and as a result, international treaties and cus-
tomary laws have emerged in all facets of the law: sales,3 evidence,4
environmental, 5 and human rights,' for example.
This changing international climate has produced a call for fed-
eral courts to acquire an awareness and understanding of interna-
tional concerns. Federal courts are asked to interpret and apply law
that was neither enacted by Congress nor pronounced by a Su-
preme Court decision. The result is an emerging body of federal
international common law.
2. James William Fullbright, Senate Speech, Mar. 27, 1964 ("We are handicapped by
[foreign] policies based on old myths rather than current realities.").
3. See, e.g., 1980 United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods, A/
Conf.97/18, Annex I (Apr. 10, 1980), reprinted in U.N. Conference for the International
Sale of Goods, OFFICIAL RECORDS 178-79 (1981) (U.N. Sales No. E.85.US). See generally
J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
SALES CONVENTION (1982).
4. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. The United States and sixteen other nations
are party to this convention.
5. Harm to the environment often crosses national borders forcing states to view the
environment as a global issue. As a consequence international environmental laws have de-
veloped to protect the environment and allocate responsibility and liability when damage
occurs. See generally D. KAY & H. JACOBSEN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-THE INTER-
NATIONAL DIMENSION, Magrow, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission
Study of 'International Liability", 80 AM J. INT'L L. 305 (1986).
6. See infra note 30.
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Federal courts are also reaching beyond domestic borders to de-
cide disputes that traditionally laid beyond their jurisdictional
reach.7 Because the courts engage in these functions, it is of utmost
importance that the legal profession understand the effects of inter-
national law on domestic jurisprudence and the courts' role in the
international picture.'
As early as 1900, Justice Gray recognized that "international
law is part of our law."9 This article discusses these much quoted
words. Section I provides some background on the sources of inter-
national law and its role in our judicial system. Sections II and III
focus upon two important, yet different, areas. These areas are the
introduction of international law in federal courts and the efforts of
federal courts to impose U.S. domestic policy internationally.
Human rights and terrorism provide examples for each
phenomenon.
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a general proposition, treaties and customary international
norms are the two principal sources of international law utilized by
U.S. courts.10 Treaties are recognized by the U.S. Constitution.1
The courts independently have recognized customary international
law as playing a prominent part in our jurisprudence. While trea-
ties and customary international law both assume leading roles,
their historic roots are divergent.
The United States Constitution provides in Article VI that "all
treaties ...shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges
in every state shall be bound thereby. ,,'2 "Self-executing trea-
7. See infra section III.
8. Some scholars argue that recent negative attitudes of the United States Government
toward the International Court of Justice's authority to decide international disputes, places
domestic courts in the position to decide important international legal controversies. See
Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281 (1988),
citing R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 170
(1964).
9. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 299, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900)
("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination.") See P. JESSUP, THE USES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1959); see also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 187-88, 221-24
(1972).
10. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. See also Statute of the International Court
of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.I.A.S. No. 993.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI (Treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
12. Id.
1990]
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ties"-treaties binding on the United States without any legislative
action-and non-self-executing treaties implemented by Congress,13
supersede all inconsistent state and local laws,1 as well as prior
inconsistent federal statutes.' 5 Treaties, like domestic legislation,
however, are not recognized by U.S. courts if they conflict with the
U.S. Constitution. 6 It is, of course, the task of the courts to deter-
mine whether a treaty is in conflict with the Constitution, but no
provision in any-treaty has been held unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court, and few have been seriously challenged.' 7
While the United States has ratified over 890 treaties and is a
signatory to 5,117 agreements, 8 much international law is not codi-
fied by a treaty to which the United States is a party. In the ab-
sence of treaties, courts are often called upon to apply general prin-
ciples of international law, or customary international law.' 9
Most commentators agree that customary international law can
be applied like a treaty. If this were so, customary international
norms could supercede federal, state and local laws.20 Unlike trea-
13. On the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, see RE-
STATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 131; People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. U.S. Dept. of
Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003, 95 S. Ct. 1445, 43 L. Ed.
2d 761 (1975); Foster and Elam v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314, L. Ed. 415 (1829)
(". . when the terms of [the treaty] . . . import a contract, when either of the parties en-
gages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule of the
Court").
14. State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920).
See also S.J. RES. 1, 83d Cong. 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. 6777 (1953) (Proposed Constitu-
tional amendment by Senator Bricker to reverse the principle of Missouri v. Holland).
15. Chae Chin Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 9
S. Ct. 623 32 L. Ed. 1068 (1889). For a comprehensive discussion of the "last in time" rule
and its four exceptions see Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional
Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of
Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988). Paust also discusses the interesting question of what
happens when a federal statute conflicts with customary international law, which, because it
is constantly evolving, is always "last in time". Id. at 418-44. See also Goldklang, Back on
Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary Inter-
national Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143 (1984).
16. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1230, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148, 1163
(1957) (". . no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power of the congress, or on any
other branch of government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.") See
generally Paust, supra note 15, at 393 n.1 (1988).
17. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 137-40.
18. Telephone interview with State Dept. Treaty Dept. (Oct. 24, 1989). See also I.
KAVASS & A. SPRUDzs, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE (1988 ed.).
19. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980) (applying custom-
ary human rights law).
20. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 131; Henkin, International Law as United
States Law, 82 MICH. L REV. 1557-59 (1984). Contra Goldklang, Back on Board The Pa-
quete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law,
supra note 15.
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ties, however, the question of what exactly is binding customary
international law is often before the courts. The threshold question
of whether the federal court should apply federal or state law be-
comes both interesting and complex. Is customary international law
state substantive law, so that under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
2 1
the federal courts must follow the lead of the state courts, or is it
"federal common law?"
Early in our history, this perplexing question was irrelevant: In-
ternational law was simply "common law" which during the era of
Swift v. Tyson21 was independently determined by federal and state
courts. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, however, ended the myth that
there was a body of federal common law that the federal courts
could interpret and apply independently of the states.
Following Erie, courts assumed that international law was part
of state common law and that in diversity cases, federal courts were
bound to apply international law as determined by the state
courts.23 As noted by Professor Louis Henkin, however, lawyers
eventually recognized that such a state of affairs "made no
sense." 24 Less than thirty years after Erie the Supreme Court made
clear in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino2 5-the seminal case
on the Act of State doctrine 26-that federal common law survived
Erie and that judge-made domestic "foreign relations law" is fed-
eral common law binding on the states. Contemporary scholars now
recognize that international law is federal and not state law. Ac-
cordingly, cases arising under international law are "cases arising
under . . . the laws of the United States '27 and are within the Ar-
ticle III judicial power of the federal courts.
In the common law model, federal courts play a prominent role
in shaping international law. They also insure that the United
States abides by treaties as well as generally recognized principles
21. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
23. See, e.g., Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1984) (Judge Hand
states that: "[S]ince the defendant was served while the cause was in the state court, thi law
of New York determines [the service's] validity, and, although the courts of that state look
to international law as a source of New York law, their interpretation of international law is
controlling on us, and we are to follow them so far as they have declared themselves.").
24. Henkin, International Law as United States Law, supra note 20, at 1559.
25. 376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct. 923, 11 L. Ed. 804 (1964).
26. The Act of State doctrine is the foreign relations equivalent of the political ques-
tion doctrine. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 109 S. Ct. 1933, 104 L. Ed. 2d. 404 (1989). It is a
prudential doctrine that prevents the judiciary from embroiling itself in affairs over which it
has little or no power.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II1.
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of customary international law. The importance placed on these in-
ternational norms and the extent to which the federal courts will
act as an enforcer is aptly illustrated in the field of human rights
law. It is here that the impact, or more accurately, the potential
impact of international law on domestic jurisprudence can be seen
most readily.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
Since 1945 the Supreme Court has used the term "human
rights" '28 in over 140 decisions" and the Ninth Circuit has men-
tioned the term of art in over 80 cases. The frequent use of the
term, however, does not necessarily indicate that international
human rights norms have had a major impact upon recent decisions
of the courts. In fact, while the courts almost daily confront issues
arguably involving human rights-freedom of expression, the death
penalty, prisoner's rights, and personal autonomy rights such as
travel-courts have been slow to incorporate international human
rights laws into domestic jurisprudence. This suggests that an un-
certain resolution of the tension between national sovereignty and
international human rights still persists in the United States. While
our government is quick to condemn China or South Africa for
practices that offend our human rights pronouncements, the United
States is not a party to any of the major human rights treaties."
28. The American Law Institute defines "human rights" as "freedoms, immunities,
and benefits which, according to widely accepted contemporary values, every human being
should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives." RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, §
701, comment (a).
29. The Court's use of the term does not necessarily mean that the Court was referring
to international human rights. See Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Ju-
risprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 210 (1983)
(finding that "human rights" has been used in 62 decisions in the last fifty years, with half of
those cases appearing in the last fifteen years).
30. In addition to the United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1153 (1969), effective Oct. 24, 1945 and the Charter of the Organization of American
States, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended 1967, 21
U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, which both contain human rights provisions and to which the
United States is a subscriber, the major international human rights conventions are: The
United Nations' International Bill of Human Rights consisting of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, signed Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3,
1976, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
adopted Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9,
[Vol. 20
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Nonratification is most often based upon U.S. reluctance to yield
sovereignty.31
While we are a charter member of the United Nations, whose
Charter contains human rights provisions, 32 most courts hold that
the charter is not self-executing and therefore not binding on the
United States. The first important case invoking this rubric arose in
California in 1958. In Sei Fujii v. State,3 3 the California Supreme
Court held that the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter were non-self-executing. Consequently, they lacked the
necessary domestic legal force to invalidate the challenged Califor-
nia Alien Land Law Statute. Although the case was never appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Sei Fujii has been followed with little
discussion or analysis by state and federal courts. Many commenta-
tors suggest that the case would be decided differently today, par-
ticularly in view of the greater specificity that international human
rights have acquired since the adoption of the United Nations
Charter. Yet, no case has explicitly departed from Sei Fujii.3 4
Because the United States is not party to the major human rights
treaties and the Charter is not binding on the courts, customary
international law and a growing body of federal human rights com-
mon law provide the primary sources to which courts turn. While
unratified treaties are not binding on the United States of their own
force, courts have found that they evidence generally recognized
1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; The International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, entered
into force July 18, 1976, G.A. Res. 3068(XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 166,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). The United States is party to the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, entered into force in the U.S. July 7,
1976, 27 U.S.T. 8289, T.I.A.S. 8289. For a comprehensive list of these and other important
international human rights treaties and non-treaty instruments see H. HANNUM & R. LIL-
LICH, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-
16 (1985); L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 991-93 (2d ed. 1987).
31. See generally Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary on the Constitutional Implications of the Proposed Genocide
Convention, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
32. United Nations Charter, supra note 30, arts. 55 & 56.
33. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (en banc).
34. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1985); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 475
U.S 1128, 102 S. Ct. 2951, 73 L. Ed. 2d. 1344 (1982); Hitai v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816, 86 S. Ct. 36, 15 L. Ed. 2d
63 (1965); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953), affd, 348 U.S. 880, 75 S.
Ct. 122, 99 L. Ed. 1161 (1954), vacated by 349 U.S. 70, 75 S. Ct. 614, 99 L. Ed. 897
(1955). For a more comprehensive list of cases, see L. SOHN, & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 944-45 (1973).
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principles of international law and thus have the force of customary
international law.3 5
One of the most interesting cases, and to date the most com-
monly cited, is the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.36 In this case the court held that the Alien Tort Claims Act37
provides the court jurisdiction to decide a tort claim brought by two
Paraguayans against a former Paraguayan chief of police who al-
legedly tortured a family member to death. The court further con-
cluded that the right to be free from torture "has become part of
customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights."38 To support its conclusion,
the court traced the evolution of this rule from the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration and other major international
human rights instruments.39
35. Under the title "Customary International Law of Human Rights" section 702 of
the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the United States states that:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encour-
ages, or condones:
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern or gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 702.
According to the comments "The customary law of human rights is part of the law of the
United States to be applied as such by the State as well as the federal courts." Id. § 702
comment (c).
36. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (1982). "The Alien Tort Statute ... is an ancient yet un-
celebrated law. Enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Statute confers original
jurisdiction on federal courts when an injured alien plaintiff bring suit against a defendant
for committing a tort in violation of the Law of Nations." Harvey, The Alien Tort Statute:
International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply Historical Trivia?, 21 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 341 (1988).
38. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882. See also contra Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S. Ct. 1354, 84 L. Ed. 377
(1985). In Tel-Oran, the court dismissed the case brought under the Alien Tort Statute for
alleged acts of terrorism in Israel. Each member of the three-judge panel filed a concurrence.
Judge Edwards believed that the statute allowed the suit, but there was insufficient evidence
that terrorism or non-official torture violated the law of nations. Judge Bork reasoned that
separation of powers concerns required that a plaintiff establish a private cause of action
before invoking the statute. Judge Robb based his conclusions on the political question doc-
trine. For a detailed discussion of this case and the different opinions, see Comment, Enforc-
ing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 74 CAL. L. REV.
127 (1986).
39. See T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 245-46
(1988); Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights Claims:
The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981). See
also Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection
[Vol. 20
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In 1980, the U.S. District Court in Kansas also applied custom-
ary international law to order the release of a detained Cuban na-
tional who arrived in the United States as an undocumented alien.40
The court held that "even though the indeterminate detention of an
excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitu-
tion or our statutory laws, [such detention] is judicially remedial as
a violation of international law."' 1
In recent death penalty decisions, moreover, customary interna-
tional human rights norms are increasingly cited. Choosing not to
follow these norms, however, the Supreme Court recently decided
in Stanford v. Kentucky; Wilkins v Missouri' that the imposition
of capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed
before the age of sixteen or seventeen did not violate evolving stan-
dards of decency and thus did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 43 Despite this
holding, which is seemingly inconsistent on its face with interna-
tional human rights law, a majority of the Court may still believe
that the customary international human rights law has a place in
eighth amendment analysis. The four dissenting Justices cited
human rights treaties44 and also stated that "contemporary stan-
dards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries is of
relevance to eighth amendment analysis."' 5 Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the majority position but not in its reasoning. While she
did not cite foreign or international laws, her concurrence followed
her argument in Thompson v. Oklahoma." In Thompson, the ma-
Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983).
40. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affid on
other grounds sub nom., 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). For an in depth discussion of this
case see Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between
Statutes and Customary International Law, supra note 15.
41. 505 F. Supp. at 798. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on appeal. It based its holding on
U.S. statutory provisions, however, rather than on international law. The court did note that
the district court's consideration of international law was appropriate and its interpretation
of the law was correct. 654 F.2d at 1388, 1390. But see Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11 th
Cir. 1984) (eleventh circuit declines to follow tenth circuit), aff d 472 U.S. 846, 105 S. Ct.
2992, 86 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1985).
42. __ U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1989).
43. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving
juveniles sentenced to the death penalty, see Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing:
Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989) (surveying the Supreme
Court's unsettled jurisprudence on this issue following Thompson v. Oklahoma,, 487 U.S.
__ 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988), see infra text accompanying note 46. See
also Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Re-
stricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983).
44. __ U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 2985-86 n.10, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 331.
45. - U.S. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 2985, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 331.
46. 487 U.S. ., 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988).
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jority held that the execution of an individual for a crime commit-
ted while under the age of fifteen was unconstitutional. In her
Thompson concurrence, Justice O'Connor cited to the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War,4 an international treaty that the United States has ratified.
It is premature to suggest that the Supreme Court is approaching
consensus on the relevance of international human rights norms to
domestic death penalty decisions. But it is safe to say that while
most of the major treaties have not been made formally part of
U.S. law by Senate ratification, they have become customary inter-
national law and the federal courts have the power to enforce them.
For the federal courts to implement United States compliance with
international human rights norms and to ensure that the courts rec-
ognize their important role in cases in which human rights are as-
serted, lawyers must continue to utilize this growing body of federal
common law.
III. TERRORISM-JUDICIAL OUTREACH
Federal courts also apply domestic laws to foreign parties and
transactions. This outreach function allows for the exportation of
U.S. criminal and commercial law beyond our borders.4
Among the most interesting examples is the exportation of U.S.
criminal laws, notably the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)." Defining various "prohibited activi-
ties" and imposing criminal and civil liability upon those who en-
gaged in them, Congress sought to punish criminal conspiracies in-
volving white collar or business crimes, the instruments or effects of
which cross interstate or international borders. While the statute is
47. 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (1955).
48. Five principles of international jurisdiction over foreign nations or foreign transac-
tions are internationally recognized. These include: (1) the territorial principle-jurisdiction
based on the incident occurring on a state's soil; (2) the nationality principle-jurisdiction
based on the nationality of the accused; (3) the passive personality principle-jurisdiction
based on the nationality of the victim; (4) the protective principle-jurisdiction based on the
state's interest in protecting itself; and (5) the universality principle-jurisdiction over uni-
versal crimes. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at 823;
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 A. J. INT'L
L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935). While historically there was some debate over the legitimacy of
the passive personality principle, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES § 30(2) (1962), all five principles are now recognized in the United
States. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, at §§ 402-404, § 402 comment (f) (discuss-
ing the passive personality principle).
49. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 ed.
& Supp. V).
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relatively new and will be tested often in court as various applica-
tions are attempted, its use in reaching across international borders
is already raising interesting questions. For example, federal courts
are involved in complex civil RICO litigation as the government of
the Philippines seeks to trace and recover public property diverted
into private assets by former President Ferdinand Marcos and his
associates."
Of equal interest to international business executives and their
lawyers is the exportation of American antitrust5 and securities
laws.52 Nationals of any country who perform acts that are legal at
home, but which are denounced as crimes in the United States by
either of these bodies of laws, may find themselves facing arrest
and prosecution in the United States if the actors later are found in
the United States or if they can be waylaid and extradited to the
United States. 3
50. See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 109 S. Ct. 1933, 104 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1989); Republic of
the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, 107
S. Ct. 1597, 94 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S. Ct. 2178, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 835 (1987); Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 714 F. Supp.
1362 (D.N.J. 1989); New York Land Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 634 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally Meagher, Recent Developments: The Marcos Cases, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J. 127 (1988) (discussing 1987 cases in the second, fourth, and ninth
circuits).
51. Antitrust laws apply to both domestic and foreign transactions. See Sherman Act
§ 1, 15 U.S.C . § 1 (1982) ("every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions is declared illegal .. "); Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982) ("'Commerce,' as
used herein means trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign na-
tions, .. "). Moreover, courts have extended U.S. antitrust laws to reach foreign acts by
foreign parties when the conduct is intended to and does affect U.S. commerce. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Inc., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally
Gervurtz, Using Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step
to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1987). But see Timberline
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A. 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (court
refrains from exercising antitrust jurisdiction where principles of comity caution against the
application of U.S. laws); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-56 (7th
Cir. 1980) (same).
52. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa. (granting U.S. courts jurisdiction over offenses
and violations of domestic securities laws).
53. Extradition occurs when an individual accused or convicted in one state is found in
the territory of another state who surrenders the individual to the state under whose laws he
or she is wanted. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, ch. 1, §§ 1-6 to 1-7. There
is no duty under international law to extradite a wanted individual, however; extradition is
only required by treaty or other equivalent legal obligations. id. ch. I, § 2-2. Extradition in
the United States is governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1984). The United States is party
to over 100 extradition treaties. See 18 U.S.C § 3181 (listing treaties). Most extradition
treaties are based on the theory aut dedere aut judicare, which imposes upon any state that
refuses to extradite an international criminal the obligation to prosecute the criminal itself.
See generally Costello, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principles Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 483 (1975).
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Furthermore, Congress recently expanded the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts to reach individuals who engage in terrorist54 acts against
U.S. citizens, even when those acts take place on foreign soil or in
international airspace or waters. Primarily based upon the principle
of passive personality jurisdiction," Congress criminalized the tak-
ing of American hostages irrespective of the locus of the seizure. 56
In some instances, the willful destruction of an aircraft, assaulting
of passengers or crew on board an aircraft, damaging an aircraft,
or placing destructive devices on board, are also illegal and actiona-
ble.57 The Act to Combat International Terrorism further autho-
rizes the Attorney General to reward individuals who furnish infor-
mation regarding certain terrorist acts. 58 And in 1986 Congress
supplemented its anti-terrorist legislation with the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Antiterrorism Act.59 The act criminalizes vari-
ous terrorist acts committed against Americans abroad."0
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, U.S. courts were fre-
quently unable to obtain jurisdiction over international terrorists
who victimized U.S. citizens. While in some instances international
treaties provided a jurisdictional basis for domestic courts to prose-
cute international terrorists, these treaties do not apply to all ter-
rorist activities. For example, if an individual seizes a foreign vessel
in international waters or a foreign aircraft over international wa-
ters, the vessel or aircraft could be a "pirate vessel" thus providing
all states jurisdiction to capture and prosecute the "pirate."6 " The
definition of piracy is very specific, however, and there are limits to
54. " 'Terrorism' is a vacuous and amorphous concept entirely devoid of an accepted
international legal meaning, let alone an objective political referent." Boyle, Preserving the
Role of Law in the War Against International Terrorism, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 735, 735
(1986). In this article, the term "terrorism" is used in its broadest sense to include all non-
military international acts of violence. See Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in the
United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 295-
96 n.13 (1987) (providing many definitions of "terrorism"). See also The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1982) (defining "terrorism" for the purpose of
authorizing domestic intelligence activities).
55. See supra note 48.
56. The Hostage Taking Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 1203 (1984).
57. The Destruction of Aircraft Act, 18 U.S.C. 32 (1984).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3071 (1984).
59. Pub. L. 99-399, ch. 113A, 100 Stat. 853, 896-907 (1986). See generally Recent
Developments, U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnap-
ping, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 957-58 (1985).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. IV 1986).
61. See Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas signed at Montego
Bay, December 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./62/122/ Cor. 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982). See generally L. HENKIN, CHANGING LAW FOR THE CHANGING SEAS 72 (1968);
Murphy, The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat International Terrorism, 25
COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 81 n.218 (1986).
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a state's ability to utilize piracy law to prosecute international
terrorists."2
International conventions on civil aviation also permit states to
intercept foreign, state-owned aircraft to gain jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed on board an aircraft.6 3 If the aircraft is not state-
owned, however, these conventions are inapplicable.
In other cases, the International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages,6 to which the United States is party, may provide the
necessary jurisdictional basis. This Convention defines hostage-tak-
ing as an international offense, 5 and thus allows for prosecution
under the universal principle of jurisdiction. 6
The antiterrorism legislation ensures that the United States can
assert jurisdiction over all cases where U.S. citizens are victimized,
even when an international treaty does not provide domestic juris-
diction. In 1989, the first trial under these laws 7 ended in Wash-
ington, D.C. with the United States obtaining a criminal conviction
62. See generally Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United
States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 18-20 (1988).
63. See The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, done Sep. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219
(entered into force Dec. 4, 1969). See also The Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860
U.N.T.S. 106 (entered into force Mar. 8, 1971); The Montreal Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T.
565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
64. Done at New York, Dec. 17, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146 (1979), reprinted
in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
65. Id. art. 1.
66. The United States may also be able to prosecute an individual if he or she is
deemed a "combatant" under the laws of war and his or her act constitutes a "grave breach"
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Times of War, signed at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, opened
for signature, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/44 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978),
reprinted in 16 1.L.M. 1391 (1977) makes the laws of war applicable to "armed conflict in
which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes" Id. art. 1, para. 4. Protocol I is generally considered to be binding customary inter-
national law. See Cassesse, The Geneva Protocol of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 55, 70-71
(1984).
For a more in-depth discussion of the various international laws under which a state can
prosecute an international terrorist, see Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in
the United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, supra note 62.
67. This was not the first suit brought in U.S. courts following acts of terrorism
abroad. Civil suits have been brought for breach of duty by victims of terrorist attacks
against airline carriers. See, e.g, In re Hijacking of Pan Am World Airways, Inc., Aircraft at
Karachi International Airport, Pakistan on September 5, 1986, 713 F. Supp. 1483 (S.D.N.Y
1989); Stanford v. Kuwait Airlines Corp., 705 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y 2989); Sweis v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
13
Goodwin: International Law in the Federal Courts
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
of Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese national who participated in the hi-
jacking of a Jordanian airplane in Beirut."8 Yunis was sentenced to
thirty years in prison. U.S. jurisdiction was premised on the fact
that the flight carried two American passengers, allowing jurisdic-
tion based on the international principles of universal and passive
personality jurisdiction and the 1984 antiterrorism legislation.6"
These Americans were held captive for over thirty hours. Neither
was killed, and they were released before the hijackers blew up the
aircraft.
American forces took custody of Yunis for prosecution only after
he was lured aboard a yacht in international waters by plain clothes
female FBI officers posing as drug dealers.7" He was flown to the
United States in a Navy jet, which was refueled over the Atlantic
to avoid "international complications. ' 71 When the flight landed at
a military airbase he was admitted without travel documents as a
prisoner in FBI custody.
In addition to finding that the court had jurisdiction under prin-
ciples of international law and domestic antiterrorism legislation,72
the district court also found that while the U.S. constitutional pro-
tection of due process under the law applies to aliens arrested by
federal officials overseas,7 3 Yunis' rights were not violated by the
abduction.74 The court based its finding that Yunis' due process
rights were not violated on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. This doctrine
allows U.S. courts to retain in personam jurisdiction over a defend-
ant irrespective of the method by which he was arrested or brought
to the United States.75 The court also found that Yunis' capture did
68. See Engleberg, U.S. Convicts Arab in Jet's Hijacking, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
1989, at A3, col. 1; Wright Younis Isic] Is Found Guilty of Air Piracy, Hostage-Taking,
L.A. Times Mar. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
69. It is undisputed that the only nexus to U.S. courts was the presence of U.S. citi-
zens on board the aircraft. "The airplane was registered in Jordan, flew the Jordanian flag
and never landed on American soil or flew over American airspace." United States v. Yunis,
681 F. Supp. 896, 899 (D.D.C. 1988).
70. Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1987, at A18, col. 1; Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al, col.
4.
7 I. ld.
72. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 899-909.
73. This holding may be called into doubt by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, - U.S. __, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990), which holds
that the Constitution does not grant foreigners in foreign countries protection from warrant-
less searches conducted by U.S. law enforcement agents.
74. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916-21 (D.D.C.), reversed on other
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
75. Ker v. People of State of Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421
(1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952), reh'g denied,
343 U.S. 937, 72 S. Ct. 768, 96 L. Ed. 1344.
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not fall within the narrow exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine es-
tablished by-the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino,76 for
"conduct of a most shocking and outrageous character. '77 The
court apparently believed that the federal officer's conduct was nec-
essary to capture Yunis.
Yunis will surely appeal his case. His attorney has stated pub-
licly 7a that an appeal may be based on, among other grounds, the
argument that the antiterrorism laws violate the 1971 Montreal
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation. 7' The Montreal Convention stipulates that
the primary rights of prosecution should be in one of three coun-
tries: (1) where the hijacking initiated, (2) where the plane landed
or (3) where the aircraft was based."s The Convention further
states that if a suspected hijacker is arrested in a fourth country,
and if his extradition is not sought by one of the primary countries,
the fourth country is obligated to submit the case to its competent
authorities for prosecution."
It will be interesting to see how federal appellate courts deal with
emerging questions about extraterritorial jurisdiction and conflicts
between the relevant domestic and international laws. The U.S.
government's position appears to be that any hijacking anywhere in
the world is a federal offense if an American national is on board
the hijacked plane or vessel.8 2 It is also apparently the U.S. position
that once our law enforcement officers have possession of a violator
of our laws anywhere in the world, it does not matter how that
possession came about.8 3 This clearly invites lawyers to study po-
tential conflicts between U.S. antiterrorism policy and international
76. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand,
398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
77. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001, 95 S. Ct. 2400, 44 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1975) (distinguishing and limiting Toscanino).
78. Wright, U.S. Sentences Arab Hijacker to 30 Years, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at
A6, col I.
79. See supra note 63.
80. Montreal Convention, supra note 63, at art. 5.
81. Id. at art. 7.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
83. See Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues
of International and Domestic Law. supra note 62, at 4-5. Findlay quotes statements made
by former President Reagan, former Secretary of State Schultz, former Attorney General
Meese, former Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead, Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-
Terrorism Oakley, and State Department Legal Advisor Sofaer all supporting the use of
force to apprehend terrorists. Recent events in Panama demonstrate that the Bush adminis-
tration also supports the use of force to abduct individuals indicted under the laws of the
United States. See A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
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legal principles against the use of force, 4 notions of national sover-
eignty and international human rights norms.8 5
It is uncertain how federal appellate courts will resolve these is-
sues. Political pressure to strike out at terrorism may be directed
creatively at other evils in other times. Principled standards for ex-
traterritorial enforcement of domestic policy are as sorely needed as
principled standards for balancing sovereignty and the moral de-
mands of international human rights laws.
CONCLUSION
The judicial branch participates, willingly or not, in the develop-
ment of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. It was not a lawyer but a
historian who said there is no such thing as foreign policy; there is
domestic policy applied externally.8" The federal courts apply inter-
national treaties and customary law; they determine whether a
treaty is self-executing; they ascertain customary norms and they
increasingly preside over the prosecution of foreigners when they
violate domestic or international laws. Accordingly, the words of
Albert Einstein, uttered in 1953, are instructive today: "[ojur de-
fense is not in armaments, nor in science, nor in going under-
ground. Our defense is in law and order."8
As the world becomes more and more interdependent and nations
achieve consensus on global problems, laws with international im-
pact will continue to proliferate. Courts will be looking increasingly
to international, as well as domestic law, to decide cases involving
issues such as environmental preservations, human rights, contracts
and crimes. It is timely to increase our preparation for these
changes.
84. See, e.g., United Nations Charter, supra note 30, art. 2(4) ("All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."). The Charter does not proscribe the use of necessary and
proportionate force in self defense. Id. at art. 51; see also The Caroline, 2 MOORE DIGEST OF
INTL. LAW 412 (1906) (". . those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'ne-
cessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation.' ").
85. See generally Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United
States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, supra note 62, at 33-39 (discussing the
possible international human rights protections afforded to international terrorists).
86. See E.R. MAY, THE MAKING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 254-60 (1975).
87. Quoted by Lapp, The Einstein Letter that Started it All, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1964 (Magazine).
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